No, seriously, today's post, like this one from a few days ago, has to do with the problem of moral luck, which is just when we blame a person for something that isn't under her control. In the last post, it looked like we were blaming Bob more than we were Fred, even though the only difference between their two situations was totally outside their control. To push that same intuition even more, consider this:
When Germany was controlled by the Nazi's in the 1930's, many ordinary citizens were faced with a difficult dilemma: cooperate with the current regime and in some small way aid in their evil acts, or refuse and be persecuted and ostracized from their community. Consider someone, let's call her Mary, who was placed in this situation and made the wrong moral choice: she helped the Nazis.We're assuming in this case that Mary made the unethical choice (fill in the details how you like to make that true), and as a result she clearly deserves some blame for what she did.
Fair enough. But what do we have to say about the person (calling him Joe) who would have done just as Mary did, but never had to face that difficult moral decision? Mary's certainly to blame--after all, she did something wrong. But do we just let Joe off the hook because he got lucky and never had to make a tough choice in his life? It doesn't seem fair to throw Mary to the wolves but give Joe the Ethical Guy Award if we know he would have done just as Mary did.
Here's what I think: the two are equally blameworthy.
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Briefly, here's my reasoning: people aren't responsible for their actions per-se--luck plays too large a role in determining what we do--but for their moral character, which is their set of conditional dispositions, a fancy way of saying the way you would act if placed in different situations.
3 comments:
Here's a question. How could the following statement ever be true: "if we know he would have done just as Mary did"? I think that it could never be true, at least as an epistemological matter.
Even if, say, Joe told us he would act like a Nazi, we simply can't know for certain. There are surely people who think of themselves as unethical in certain ways but, when presented with an actual chance to act, choose rightly. In short, I'm not sure there is any substitute for acting like a Nazi.
Now, I actually tend to agree that moral character is the important part here. But I'm not sure what it could be that can be discussed in isolation from the actions people actually take. I don't have Aristotle quotes at my fingertips, but didn't he say something basically like this for virtuous character?
Perhaps a better example is the set of Lucky/Unlucky Fault/No Fault drivers from J.J. Thomson's article on this issue? ("The Decline of Cause") In that case, each person has actually acted, it is just the consequences that are different.
And, by the way, cool blog! I hope you keep it up.
Kyle,
Thanks for the comment, I really appreciate it! I'll post a general response to your ideas tomorrow, but I thought I'd give a more technical comment here, just so I can make a few more points.
Briefly (since I cover this in my general post) there are two reasons why I think your objection about Joe doesn't affect my example:
1. Human behavior *is*, for the most part, predictable (check out pretty much any new research in social pscyhology today and you'll see lots of crazy examples). We can't predict anyone's behavior 100%, but I'm pretty sure, for example, I'm going to be at work on my computer at 9:00 am tomorrow.
2. The problem you pose is *epistemological*, not ontological. Even if I don't know what a person would do in some circumstance, that doesn't change the fact of the matter--there is a particular way she would act in a given circumstance (even if I don't know what it is).
Your point about moral character's relationship to action is definitely well-taken, and that's pretty much my view on the subject: practically speaking, the way we determine a person's moral character is by taking a look at their actions. The important point, though, is that we've now shifted moral responsibility away from a person's actual actions, and onto their dispositions.
And finally, to touch on Aristotle, I'm afraid he wouldn't be too keen on my theory: Aristotle's view of ethics is substantially different than modern Western thinking, and the short end of it is that he would have no problem with the idea that some people get lucky and others don't when it comes to moral responsibility. He also thinks we ought to do what we can so that we have a virtuous character, but having that type of character isn't an end in itself (as I believe it is); it's only good because it actually leads to eudaimonia.
And finally, as to JJ Thomson's article, I'm afraid I haven't read it, but I might have to check it out in the near future.
Thanks again for the post!
--TMG
TMG,
Happy to comment. A few responses:
1 - There is a gap between predictable and determined, isn't there? In what sense is it right to hold someone morally blameworthy for the *likelihood* that they will do a certain thing in the future? Take your example - should you be paid simply because it is likely you will show up for your job or should you only be paid when you *actually* show up for your job? I would think (and my employer would agree I'm sure) that actually showing up is a requirement. Why isn't actually doing something a requirement for being blamed?
2 - Ah, "the fact of the matter." What is that? That is a debate for somewhere else I'm sure, but I would submit that in the ethical context, there is no external, "fact of the matter" to judge. If we can't ever know something, we can't ever assign blame for it, even if from some external, all-knowing perspective the "fact of the matter" dictates that blame should be assigned.
Also, Aristotle: I do not agree with your description of Aristotle. I do not think that virtue is purely a step along the way to eudaimonia, a pure means. Virtue is part of what being eudaimon is. While you may not be able to say it is an end in itself (though I'm not sure this is correct), so what? It is a constituent part of eudaimonia, and it does not cleanly fit a means-ends schema. I think this article puts it well, that doing well "consists in" activites done in accordance with virtue.
On this stuff, I have to confess I'm a big fan of John McDowell's take. That may explain a bit where I'm coming from, if you are familiar with McDowell.
Cheers,
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